The return to firm investment in human capital

In this paper the authors estimate the rate of return to firm investments in human capital in the form of formal job training. They use a panel of large firms with unusually detailed information on the duration of training, the direct costs of training, and several firm characteristics such as their output, workforce characteristics, and capital stock. Their estimates of the return to training vary substantially across firms. On average it is -7 percent for firms not providing training and 24 percent for those providing training. Formal job trainingis a good investment for many firms and the economy, possibly yielding higher returns than either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling. In spite of this, observed amounts of formal training are small.Primary Education,Education For All,Access&Equity in Basic Education,Tertiary Education,Economic Theory&Research

Enforcement of labor regulation and informality

Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.

The return to firm investments in human capital

In this paper the authors estimate the rate of return to firm investments in human capital in the form of formal job training. The authors use a panel of large firms with detailed information on the duration of training, the direct costs of training, and several firm characteristics. The authors estimate of the return to training are substantial (8.6 percent) for those providing training. Results suggest that formal job training is a good investment for these firms possibly yielding comparable returns to either investments in physical capital or investments in schooling. The paper proceeds as follows. Section two describes the data the authors use. In section three, the authors present basic framework for estimating the production function and the cost function. In section fourth the authors present empirical estimates of the costs and benefits of training and compute the marginal internal rate of return for investments in training. Finally, section fifth concludes.,LaborPolicies,Primary Education,Education For All,Access&Equity in Basic Education

The return to firm investment in human capital

In this paper we estimate the rate of return to firm investments in human capital in the form of formal job training. We use a panel of large firms withun usually detailed information on the duration of training, the direct costs of training, and several firm characteristics such as their output,workforce characteristics and capital stock. Our estimates of the return to training vary substantially across firms. On average it is - 7% for firms not providing training and 24% for those providing training. Formal job training is a good investment for many firms and the economy, possibly yielding higher returns than either investments in physical capitalor investments in schooling. In spite of this, observed amounts of formal training are very small.On-the-Job Training, Panel Data, Production Function, Rate of Return

Mandated benefits, employment, and inequality in a dual economy

The authors study the effect of enforcement of labor regulation in Brazil, an economy with a large informal sector and strict labor law. Enforcement affects mainly the degree of compliance with mandated benefits (severance pay, health, and safety) in the formal sector and the registration of informal workers. The authors find that stricter enforcement leads to higher unemployment but lower income inequality. The authors also show that, at the top of the formal wage distribution, workers bear the cost of mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. This is not true at the bottom, because of downward wage rigidity. As a result, formal sector jobs at the bottom of the wage distribution become more attractive, inducing the low skilled self-employed to search for formal jobs.Labor Markets,Transport Economics Policy&Planning,Labor Policies,,Economic Theory&Research

Enforcement of labor regulation, informal labor, and firm performance

This paper investigates how enforcement of labor regulation affects the firm's use of informal employment and its impact on firm performance. Using firm level data on informal employment and firm performance, and administrative data on enforcement of regulation at the city level, the authors show that in areas where law enforcement is stricter firms employ a smaller amount of informal employment. Furthermore, by reducing the firm's access to unregulated labor, stricter enforcement also decreases average wages, productivity, and investment. The results are robust to several specification changes, and to instrumenting enforcement with (1) measures of access of labor inspectors to firms, and (2) measures of general law enforcement in the area where the firm is located.Labor Markets,Work&Working Conditions,Labor Standards,Municipal Financial Management,Labor Management and Relations

Enforcement of Labor Regulation and Informality

Enforcement of labor regulations in the formal sector may drive workers to informality because they increase the costs of formal labor. But better compliance with mandated benefits makes it attractive to be a formal employee. We show that, in locations with frequent inspections workers pay for mandated benefits by receiving lower wages. Wage rigidity prevents downward adjustment at the bottom of the wage distribution. As a result, lower paid formal sector jobs become attractive to some informal workers, inducing them to want to move to the formal sector.labor regulation, informality

Evaluating Hospital Efficiency Adjusting for Quality Indicators: an Application to Portuguese NHS Hospitals

The objective of this paper is to develop a methodology to incorporate measures of hospital quality in efficiency analysis, applied to Portuguese NHS hospitals, in order to assess whether there is a trade-off between efficiency and quality in Portuguese hospitals. We develop and compare two methodologies to compute DEA technical efficiency scores adjusted for output quality, for a sample of Portuguese NHS hospitals in 2009. When DEA efficiency scores are adjusted for output quality, the decision making units that lie on the technical efficiency frontier remain largely unaltered, even if a great weight is given to quality indicators over quantity indicators of output. Nevertheless, we find that outside of the frontier adjusting for quality does have an impact in efficiency scores.We conclude that the empirical evidence is not sufficient to identify a clear trade-off between efficiency and quality in the hospitals under review, implying the possibility that efficiency gains may achieved without a significant sacrifice of service quality. Nevertheless, there is enough evidence to conclude that analyzing hospital efficiency without consideration of differences in quality of service will generate biased results. When perceived quality is brought to the analysis, the gap between efficient and inefficient units tends to widen.Hospital efficiency, Hospital quality, Data Envelopment Analysis